This article explores a proprietary approach to understanding the nature of rights to human biomaterials, according to which cells (organs, tis sues) become objects of the property rights of the person from whom they originate by virtue of their separation from the human body. It is argued that for the legal transformation of a cell (tissue, organ) from an integral part of a subject (an individual) to an object of civil law (a thing), the fact of separation is insufficient, as circumstances significant from the perspective of civil law regulation remain unaccounted for. Granting the originator ownership of the biomaterial from the moment of separation, regardless of their will to appropriate it, the legality of the separation, and a number of other circumstances, associated with the separation of the cell (tissue, organ) from the human body, fails to take into account the specifics of civil law regulation, the key elements of which are the autonomy of will and the equality of the parties involved, nor the interests of the originator themselves in many cases. It is noted, that the proprietary approach does not take into account the nature of the interest in biomaterials that belongs to the originator, and does not always ensure significant public interests in human biomaterial.